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ARREST REQUIREMENT FOR
ADMINISTERING BLOOD TESTS
The intoxicated driver has become one of the most serious
problems on the nation's highways. Recent blood tests performed on
fatally injured drivers' indicated that between sixty-five and seventy-
five percent had alcohol concentrations in their blood of over 0.15
percent, 2 an amount above the minimum required for a finding of
intoxication. 3 It has been suggested that the best method of dealing
with drunken driving is to provide stronger law enforcement which
will increase the potential drunken driver's expectation of being
detected and convicted.4 This suggestion would require increased
effectiveness in the investigatory procedures such as blood tests and
other scientific means used by the police to detect the level of alcohol
consumption. Although the use of such scientific tests clearly must
meet the fourth amendment's requirement that a search be
reasonable,5 the courts have not yet articulated the precise conditions
under which the requirement is met. This note will explore the existing
state requirements and the emerging constitutional requirements for
administering blood tests.
STATE LAWS DEALING WITH INTOXICATED DRIVERS
Driving while intoxicated is a criminal offense in every state., At
least forty-six states have adopted the language of the Uniform
1. Jacobsen v. International Transport, Inc., 391 F.2d 49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
833 (1968), held that a blood test taken from a corpse was not an unreasonable search and
seizure within the fourth amendment.
2. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 421,437 (1969).
In order to reach a 0.10% concentration of alcohol in the blood, a 150 lb. person would have
to drink 7 ounces of 80 proof liquor in one hour. The same person would have to drink 10
ounces of 80 proof liquor in one hour to reach a 0.15% concentration level. Walker, King,
Neilson & Turkel, Alcohol and Other Factors in California's Highway Fatalities. 14 J. FoR.
Sc. 429 (1969).
3. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
4. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957); Cramton, supra note 2, at 438-41.
Professor Cramton warns, however, that certain other factors must be considered in reaching
the precise level where the effectiveness of legal deterrence mechanisms is maximized. For
example, the effectiveness ofeach sanction as well as the likelihood ofenforcement will vary with
different groups and classes in society. Also, the severity of the sanctions can reach a point of
diminishing return when the severity of the penalty is out of proportion to the seriousness with
which society views the unlawful activity and those responsible for enforcing the law become less
likely to seek a conviction.
5. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
6. R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 1.01, at4 (2d ed. 1966).
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Vehicle Code in labeling the specific offense as driving "under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." ' 7 Due to the many degrees of
intoxication and the different effects which alcohol has upon different
individuals the courts have found it difficult to verbalize a precise test
of "under the influence." Generally, the state is required to show that
the .defendant drank enough alcohol, regardless of the amount, to
have sustained substantial mental or physical impairment.8 The state,
however, does not have to show that such impairment actually
interfered with the driver's operation of the vehicle at the time he was
appiehended. Public policy demands that the drinking driver be
stopped at some point prior to proving himself an actual menace to
others on the highway Yet, as a practical matter, proof of actual
interference with the defendant's driving may be necessary to convince
the jury that he was "under the influence." Absent some quantitative
test of his impairment, such as a blood test, prosecutions for drunken
driving have had to rely on such evidence as slurring of speech, smell
of the breath, and exaggerated or uncontrolled mannerisms. While
these evidentiary facts have been generally sufficient to establish
probable cause for arrest, 0 they have generally not sufficed to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Scientists are in agreement that the blood test is the most effective
scientific method of detecting the amount of alcohol a person has
consumed.12 In order to overcome the evidentiary problems of proving
intoxication, many states have adopted legislation which would give
the results of blood tests the effect of rebuttable presumptions as to
guilt of criminal charges.' 3 The general rule has been that anyone with
7. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 11-902(a) (1967):
"It is unlawful and punishable as provided in section 11-902.2 for any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be in actual physical control or any
vehicle within this State." See generally KNOW THE LAW 60-86 (R. Donigan & E. Fisher
eds. 1958).
8. See, e.g.. Dawkins v. Chavez, 132 Colo. 61,285 P.2d 821 (1955); State v. Hightower, 238
La. 876, 116 So. 2d 699 (1959).
9. State v. Weeden, 94 R.I. 1, 2, 177 A.2d 182, 183 (1962). See generally R. DONIGAN,
CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 4-8 (2d ed. 1966).
10. See. e.g., State v. Gillespie, I00 N.J. Super. 71,241 A.2d 239 (App. Div. 1968).
11. See generally Comment, The Drinking Driver: An Approach to Solving a Problem of
Underestimated Severity, 14 VILL. L. REv. 97 (1968). In Boston during 1964 only 27 out of 83
persons charged and brought to trial for driving while intoxicated were convicted without
evidence of blood-alcohol concentrations. Id. at 103.
12. See generally Report of the Fourth International Conference on Alcohol and Traffic
Safety, 1966 CRIM. L. REV. 69.
13. Most states apply the presumption only in cases of driving while under the influence of
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less than 0.05 percent alcohol in his blood is presumed not to be under
the influence of alcohol, and anyone with a concentration level above
0.10 percent, or 0.15 percent in many states, is presumed to be under
the influence of alcohol.14
Due to the effectiveness of the blood test in detecting intoxication,
many persons have refused to take the test. For this reason most states
have enacted so-called implied consent statutes.' 5 Under these statutes
a person is deemed to have given his consent to a blood test in
exchange for the privilege of driving on the highways; 6 however, if the
alcohol. Several other states, however, apply the presumption to other criminal actions as
well-for example, involuntary manslaughter. See R. DONIGAN, supra note 9, at 27.
14. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 11-902(b) (1967):
Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the
person's blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood,
urine, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in the person's blood,
it shall be presumed that the person was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.10 percent by weight
of alcohol in the person's blood, such fact shall not give rise to any pr- umption that the
person was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be
considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
3. If there was at that time 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person's
blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Some states have 0.15 percent concentration levels as presumptive of intoxication. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (Supp.
1971); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 32-23-7 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-57 (Supp. 1970).
15. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 154(a) (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (1970); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (Supp. 1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1969); CAL.
VEHICLE CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1970) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (Supp. 1971);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1625.1 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 286-151 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-352 (1967); IOWA CODE § 321B.3 (1966);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (Supp. 1969); Ky. REv. STAT. § 186.565 (1968); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 32:661 (Supp. 1970); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 90, § 24(1) (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (Supp. 1971); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 564.441 (Supp. 1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69(a) (1966); N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:4-
50.2 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2.6 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-
20-01 (Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 751 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.634 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1
(Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 32-23-
10 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1044 (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10
(Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1188 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1970);
NV. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1970).
16. See R. DONIGAN, supra note 9, at 310-11, citing UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-205.1(a)
(1962):
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this Stateshall
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driver refuses to give his consent no test may be administered.
Although in Schmerber v. California17 the Supreme Court indicated
that consent is not a constitutional prerequisite for the administration
of a lawful blood test, these statutes do not authorize unconsented
blood tests since it is unclear how much physical. force can be used
before the driver's due process rights are violated. 8 The statutes,
instead, provide other incentives to induce the driver's submission,
most commonly the revocation of the driver's license upon his
refusal. 9 Since one might prefer the inconvenience of license
revocation to a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol,
these statutes have not always proven successful in inducing
submission and have been criticized as being overly burdensome on
the police.20 Some states have attempted to compensate for this
weakness in their implied consent laws by making refusal to submit
admissible into evidence against the driver at his trial for drunken
driving.2'
be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of section 11-902, to a
chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor....
E. FisHER, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW 60-61 (1961).
17. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
18. See generally McIntyre & Chabraja, Intensive Search ofa Suspect's Body and Clothing,
58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 18,25 (1967).
19. E.g., UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6.205.1(c) (1962), cited in R. DONIGAN, supra note 9,
at 311.
20. See generally McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note 1, at 24.
21. There seems to be no constitutional barrier to admitting such evidence. In Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) the Supreme Court held that the defendant had no
constitutional right to object to an otherwise valid blood test. This situation is distinguishable
from a case such as Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) where the defendant's right to
remain silent was jeopardized by allowing the prosecution to comment on the defendant's failure
to testify. In that case the Court reasoned ihat such comment by the prosecution penalized the
defendant for asserting his constitutional rights. In blood test cases, unlike Griffin, no
constitutional right is being jeopardized by admitting into evidence the defendant's refusal to
take a blood test.
Some statutes specifically allow admission into evidence of a refusal. See. e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.2(b) (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(h) (Supp. 1971).
Where there is no legislative mandate the courts have gone both ways. The rationale for
admitting evidence of the refusal is that the refusal has the same probative value as other conduct
after the commission of a crime such as an attempt to escape and concealment of evidence. Cf.,
State v. Dugas, 252 La. 346, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968). See also C. MCCORMICK, EViDENCE
§§ 246, 250 (1954).
Other courts have refused to construe the statutes'to allow admissibility absent express
legislative intent. See, e.g., State v. Munroe, 22 Conn. Supp. 321, 171 A.2d 419 (Cir. Ct. 1961);
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New York was the first state to enact an implied consent statute. 22
In Shutt v. McDuff' a New York court held that the statute violated
the driver's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures, since absent a requirement that the driver be placed under
arrest prior to being subjected to the blood test, the statute "was
absolutely lacking in reasonable safeguards against arbitrary and
unreasonable actions by police officers." 24 The state did not appeal
the case, and the legislature subsequently enacted a new law which
included the requirement that the driver be arrested prior to requiring
his submission to the blood test.2 Most states have followed the
present New York statute in requiring an arrest as a precondition to
applying its implied consent law.26 In those states which require an
arrest, the accused has an absolute right to refuse to submit to a blood
test, and the state can neither revoke his license nor introduce his
refusal into evidence at trial.27 Most states have interpreted the arrest
requirement to be of constitutional and not merely statutory origin.?s
The issue whether an arrest prior to administering a blood test is
constitutionally mandated is of importance to a state whether or not
its implied consent statute contains an arrest provision, or, indeed,
whether or not the state has enacted an implied consent statute. The
scope of some consent statutes has been limited by judicial
interpretation to the specific crime of driving under the influence. 29
Thus, even though an implied consent statute with an arrest
requirement is in force, there are still instances, such as those
involving the crime of involuntary manslaughter or criminal
State v. Ingram, 67 N.J. Super. 21, 169 A.2d 860 (Passaic County Ct. 1961); People v. Stratton,
286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1955), afJfd, I N.Y.2d 664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 150
N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956).
22. Act ofApril 19, 1953, ch. 854, § 71-a, [1953] N.Y. Laws 1876.
23. 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
24. Id. at 51-52, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 126-27.
25. N.Y. VEH. &TRAP. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
26. See statutes at note 15 supra excepting IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (1966) (although
this provision requires an arrest prior to requesting that a conscious driver submit to a blood
test, no arrest is required prior to administering a blood test to an unconscious driver); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1971).
27. See, e.g., State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406,446 P.2d 307 (1968).
28. See, e.g., State v. Towry, 26 Conn. Supp. 35, 210 A.2d 455 (Super. Ct. 1965); State v.
Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406,446 P.2d 307 (1968); cf. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266,79 N.W.2d 810
(1956).
29. Compare State v. Capelle, 285 Minn. 205, 172 N.W.2d 556 (1969) and State v. Aarhus,
80 S.D. 569, 128 N.W.2d 881 (1964) with People v. Young, 42 Misc. 2d 540,248 N.Y.S.2d 287
(Weschester County Ct. 1964).
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negligence, where the constitutional question as to the validity of the
administration of a blood test will be applicable.' More importantly,
however, since the arrest requirement has been incorporated into the
implied consent law on the assumption that it is of constitutional
origin, if the Constitution in fact requires something less, the need for
more effective law enforcement may dictate amending the laws. 31 In
the three jurisdictions which require no arrest prior to administering
the test32 and in those jurisdictions with no implied consent statute, the
importance of determining if there is a constitutional requirement is
obvious.
THE APPLICATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS
The fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures. ' 33 Furthermore, no warrants can be issued except upon
probable cause. 3' The warrant requirement has been interpreted to
mean that a search can be performed only after a warrant has been
issued by a judicial officer who has determined that probable cause
exists. -5 There are, however, two exceptions to the general warrant
requirement. A police officer can perform a warrantless search when
it is incident to a lawful arrest.36 Likewise, a warrantless search is
permitted when special circumstances exist such that a delay in seizing
30. One might argue the logical extension of the implied consent rationale would be to allow
blood tests without an arrest or search warrant since the driver could be deemed to have waived
his constitutional rights upon accepting a driver's license from the state. No court has taken the
implied consent rationale that far. Cf. State v. Dennington, 51 Del. 322, 164 A.2d 865 (1960).
Certainly there is a serious question whether such a waiver of constitutional rights would be
found valid. The automobile has become such a necessary item in modern life, that the
individual would have no real choice if he had to choose between waiving his protection from
arbitrary searches and seizures and not being able to drive. Such consent would lack any real
volitional content. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction In
ConstituhionalLaw, 81 HARM. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
31. Although the Virgin Island's statute states that an arrest is a prerequisite to a blood test,
the courts have construed arrest to mean only that the defendant be under some sort of police
custody. See Virgin Islands v. Quinones, 301 F. Supp. 246 (D.V.I. 1969).
32. Id., State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N.W.2d 650 (1966); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. I,
268 A.2d 1 (1970). See also People v. Huber, 232 Cal. App. 2d 663,43 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (California subsequently enacted an implied consent statute which requires the test
to be made incident to an arrest. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1970).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
36. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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the evidence would risk its destruction or removal from the
jurisdiction. 37
In Breithaupt v. Abram38 the Supreme Court rejected the
petitioner's claim that his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights
were violated by a warrantless blood test not taken incident to his
arrest39 because, regardless of the validity of his claim, the
exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence did not apply in state
court proceedings. 4 The Court also rejected the petitioner's
fourteenth amendment due process claim, holding that a blood test
performed in a hospital environment did not "shock the conscience"
of the Court.41 Because blood tests were said to have become too
routine a procedure in today's world to be considered brutal, 2 the
Court distinguished blood tests administered in a hospital
environment from forced stomach pumping, declared violative of the
fourteenth amendment in Rochin v. California.4 3
Breithaupt is still authoritative to the extent that it held properly
administered blood tests are not shocking to the conscience of the
Court. However, the exclusionary rule was subsequently extended to
state court proceedings,4 and in Schmerber v. California" blood tests
were held to be searches within, the meaning of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments.-6 In that case Schmerber was taken to a
37. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
38. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
39. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures had already been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment so as to prevent unreasonable intrusions by state
officers. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
40. 352 U.S. at 434. The exclusionary rule was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), in which case the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained by federal officers in a manner which contravened the defendant's fourth
amendment rights could not be introduced into evidence at this subsequent trial in federal court.
By disallowing the admission of unlawfully seized evidence the Court hoped to reduce the
incentive for making unlawful searchs and seizures.
Although the prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures was incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment and made applicable to the states, the Supreme Court initially refused to
extend the exclusionary rule to state court proceedings. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). Some states later adopted such a rule, holding that blood tests taken without a search
warrant and not incident to the defendant's arrest were unreasonable searches and seizures, and,




43. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
46. The Court also held that petitioner's fifth amendment right against self incrimination
Vol. 1971:6011
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hospital after suffering injuries in an automobile accident. While at
the hospital the investigating officer noticed that Schmerber's breath
smelled of alcohol and that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. The
officer arrested Schmerber for driving under the influence of alcohol
and over Schmerber's objection had a doctor perform a blood test.
Schmerber was subsequently convicted. Reviewing that conviction,
the Supreme Court held that the blood test was not an unreasonable
search and seizure 7 because it was incident to a valid arrest.48 While
the Court said that even a valid arrest would not justify a general
exploratory search into the accused's person, it found the search to be
reasonable here because alcohol in the blood begins to dissolve shortly
after drinking, thus constituting an emergency wherein any delay of
the test in order to obtain a warrant would risk the destruction of the
evidence. 9
The emergency doctrine, upon which the Court in Schmerber
seemed to rely in part, was first enunciated by the Court in Carroll v.
United States.50 In Carroll the warrantless stop and search of a
moving vehicle by police officers was held to be justified because the
officers had probable cause to believe that contraband was being
carried and because the vehicle was in transit, making it impossible
for the officers to obtain a warrant prior to the search. 51 The
emergency doctrine was later extended to searches of vehicles that had
come to rest at the suspect's home because of the great possibility that
the vehicle would be moved before the officer could return with a
search warrant.52
The Supreme Court in Schmerber did not explicitly state whether
or not the emergency doctrine could be used to justify warrantless
searches of the human body independent of an arrest, but several
courts have relied on Schmerber in so applying the doctrine. "3 Serious
questions arise, however, as to whether the application of the
emergency doctrine in such a situation can protect the individual from
was not violated because the evidence was not communicative in nature. Id. at 760-65. See
generally Note, Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Delineates the Relationship Between the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 1967 DuKE L.J. 367.
47. 384 U.S. at 772.
48. Id. at 768.
49. Id. at 768-70.
50. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
51. Id. at 153.
52. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
53. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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unreasonable governmental denials of liberty and privacy. In theory
the emergency doctrine requires that the investigating officer have
probable cause to believe that the suspect was drinking before he can
request that a blood test be administered. In practice, however,
without the independent determination of probable cause by a
magistrate prior to the blood test, the defendant may be forced to
suffer the inconvenience and embarrassment of an unlawful search,
the consequences of which cannot be erased even if there is a
subsequent finding that probable cause did not exist. If the officer
does not have probable cause to believe that the suspect has been
drinking but merely has a suspicion of such activity, the emergency
doctrine provides no safeguard against his requesting that the suspect
be given a blood test and then either arresting or releasing the suspect
depending on the results of the test. The emergency doctrine thus acts
as an incentive to the police to make investigatory searches without
probable cause. It is this type of general investigatory search,
infringing upon individual liberty and privacy, against which the
fourth amendment is directed.-5 The emergency doctrine has been
applied in auto search cases because there may be no other means of
enabling the police to effectively combat the use of vehicles for
transporting contraband. It should not be applied in blood test cases
without an equally compelling reason.
Application of the Emergency Doctrine
Despite the potential problems in extending the emergency
doctrine to blood tests, in State v. Findlay" the Iowa Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless blood test performed on an unconscious driver
who was not under arrest. The court found the police officer's
testimony that the defendant smelled of alcohol at the time of the
blood test was sufficient to establish probable cause for the search of
the suspect's blood. The existence of an emergency due to the
evaporation of the alcohol was deemed sufficient to justify a
warrantless search. The Iowa court analogized the taking of blood to
the warrantless search of moving vehicles. 56 Application of the
54. Cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the
harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more clear than
that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry. . . . Id. at 726.
55. 259 Iowa 733, 145 N.W.2d 650 (1966).
56. Id. at 742, 145 N.W.2d at 656.
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emergency doctrine to blood tests was said by the court to be even
more compelling than in the case of vehicle searches, since the alcohol
in the blood will not merely disappear but will be totally destroyed
within two hoursA7 The Findlay court also indicated that fourth
amendment requirements might be less stringently applied in the case
of blood tests than in other types of bodily invasions, reasoning that
because no pain, suffering or injury was inflicted, such a "minor
intrusion" into the body of the accused is not prohibited by tHe
Constitution.8
The emergency doctrine relied upon by the court in Findlay has
been the primary rationale upon which warrantless blood tests not
incident to an arrest have been allowed." A very practical distinction
exists, however, between vehicle searches and blood tests. In the
former situation the investigating officer himself is permitted to make
the search at the scene, because it may well be physically impossible
for him to leave in order to obtain a search warrant or an arrest
warrant without risking the removal of the suspected contraband. In
cases involving blood tests, however, the officer must seek the
assistance of qualified medical personnel,6" which assumes his ability
to leave the scene accompanied by the suspect. The limitations under
which he operates are temporal rather than spatial. Time is a less
severe limitation than is a requirement that he be in two places at
once. Moreover, the time required for the blood test represents a more
substantial infringement of the suspect's liberty than does that
required for a vehicle search. In addition, the lag between the taking
of the accused into custody and the administering of the blood test
offers the officer an opportunity to make further observations of the
suspect's behavior. Such observations can be introduced into evidence
57. Id.
58. Id. at 739, 145 N.W.2d at 654. "So long as the measures adopted do not amount to a
substantial invasion of individual rights, society must not be prevented from seeking to combat
this hazard to the safety of the public." Id. at 744, 145 N.V.2d at 657, quoting from People v.
Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766,772,312 P.2d 690,694 (1957).
59. See generally Note, Destruction of Evidence-A Rationale for Blood Tests Without an
Arrest?; 18 STAN. L. Rav. 243 (1965); 79 HARV. L. REv. 677 (1966).
60. There are two requirements any search must meet in order for the search to be
reasonable. First, the search must be justified under the circumstances, either by warrant issued
on probable cause, incident to a lawful arrest, or by an emergency situation. Second, the test
must be performed in a reasonable manner. The Supreme Court has apparently assumed that, as
applied to blood tests, the latter test of reasonableness requires that the blood test be performed
by qualified medical personnel in a "medical environment." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 772 (1966). See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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at trial. Although the fifth amendment requirement that the suspect
be advised of his right to remain silent would prevent the officer from
using this period for the purpose of interrogating the suspect without
making an arrest, there is no protection against the police using this
period for making in-custody investigations by observation. In State
v. Gillespie"1 a New Jersey court upheld the introduction into evidence
of information obtained by a police doctor through such an in-
custody observation even though the defendant had been unlawfully
arrested and detained. The arrest had been made without a warrant on
charges that the accused was driving under the influence of alcohol,
although the officer did not see the accused driving. Such an arrest is
unlawful in New Jersey since a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor
can only be made if the offense was committed in the presence of the
arresting officer. Nevertheless, the court applied the emergency
doctrine to the evidence obtained, reasoning that because the
characteristics and mannerisms caused by intoxication would be
destroyed as sobriety returned, an emergency existed which justified
the making of in-custody observations. Since the emergency doctrine
operates independent of an arrest requirement the court held that the
unlawfulness of the arrest did not affect the validity of the search.62
The net effect of such an application of the emergency doctrine to
blood test cases is that the police can detain the suspect, make a
warrantless blood test and observe his behavior, and then, having
completed this in-custody investigation, decide whether to arrest the
suspect based upon the results of the investigation. Vehicle searches,
on the other hand, do not present a significant problem of detention
since the time involved in stopping and searching the vehicle is of
relatively short duration. Moreover, the risk of indiscriminate
gathering of evidence during a vehicle search is offset by the severity
of the limitations under which the police would otherwise be forced to
operate. Because the emergency doctrine presents greater problems
for the protection of the suspect's liberty in blood test cases than it
does in vehicle search cases, an attempted analogy between these two
situations is not altogether persuasive.
A further distinction between vehicle and body searches may be
the degree of constitutional protection which the object being searched
is accorded. In Findlay the blood test was characterized as only a
61. 100 NJ. Super. 71,241 A.2d 239 (App. Div. 1968).
62. Id. at 86, 241 A.2d at 247.
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"minor intrusion" into the suspect's privacy. 63 The Iowa court
assumed that the suspect's person is under no greater constitutional
protection in the emergency situation than is a vehicle.6' Subsequent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have indicated to the
contrary.
In Chambers v. Maroney65 the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of a warrantless vehicle search which was neither incident to arrest nor
justifiable on the grounds of an emergency since the car was securely
in police custody at the time of the search. The majority concluded
that the search was reasonable because the auto could have been
searched at the time of the arrest, and the mere fact that the police
waited until the car was in their custody made the search no less
reasonable." In speaking for the majority in Chambers, however,
Justice White made it clear that the Court's test was not meant to be
extended to searches of other types of property. He remarked that
there is "a constitutional difference between houses and cars." 7
Although Justice White did not state what this difference is, certainly
it is not merely one of mobility-the original justification for the
emergency doetrine 6s-since a vehicle held in police custody and a
fixed structure such as a house are both reasonably certain of not
being moved during the time a search warrant is being obtained. The
constitutional distinction, rather, must be that the homeowner has a
greater expectation of being secure in his privacy than does the car
owner. The car is a public conveyance in the sense that it is relatively
open to public exposure and appears on the public highways. The
home, however, is a place in which the individual expects to enjoy the
maximum privacy that society will afford him. This same rationale
should apply to the human body.6 9 Certainly the body is as intimate
63. 259 Iowa at 739, 145 N.W.2d at 654.
64. Id. at 742, 145 N.W.2d at 656.
65. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
66. In this case the defendant and three other persons were arrested on charges of armed
robbery. The car in which the men were riding when they were arrested was not searched at the
time of the arrest, but was taken to the police station where it was thoroughly searched without a
warrant. The search produced evidence which linked the defendant and the others with several
robberies.
67. 399 U.S. at 52.
68. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
69. "Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings and absent an
emergency, no less should be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,770 (1966).
[Vol. 1971:601
ADMINISTERING BLOODTESTS
and as central to one's privacy as is the home.70 The body may be
more subject to public intrusions than the home in the sense that
blood tests are required for marriage and for induction into the armed
services; however, in terms of police interference with privacy in an
accusatorial context there seems to be little difference in an
individual's right to protection.
The Supreme Court's willingness to safeguard the right to bodily
privacy is indicated by its decision in Davis v. Mississippi7
invalidating the warrantless fingerprinting of a suspect who had not
yet been arrested. The Court recognized that fingerprinting was only a
minor intrusion upon the defendant's personal security, 72 but
concluded that the fourth amendment's warrant requirement "would
seem not to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context." 73
Admittedly, the Court distinguished this case from an emergency
situation,74 there being no fear of destruction of the fingerprints.
Nevertheless the differences inherent in the nature of the emergency
involved in blood tests and vehicle searches and the greater degree of
constitutional protection required of the individual's person leads to
the tentative conclusion that a wholesale adoption of the emergency
doctrine as applied to vehicle searches cannot be made as to blood
tests. A conclusive answer to the question whether some greater
procedural safeguard should be placed upon the administering of
blood tests than would be required under the emergency doctrine
cannot be had without determining what alternative to the emergency
doctrine is available and whether the degree of protection that
alternative gives justifies the burden which it places upon police
investigations.
Requirement of a Prior Arrest
Implied consent statutes of most states require a valid arrest prior
to the administration of a blood test.75 The reason for requiring a
prior arrest is that the blood test itself should not be a factor upon
70. The fourth amendment speaks of the right of the people "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 484
(1965), the Court states that this and other guarantees of the Bill of Rights create "zones of
privacy:'
71. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
72. Id. at 727.
73. Id. at 728.
74. Id. at 727.
75. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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which the determination to arrest is made, and correspondingly, that
probable cause should be established prior to the taking in order to
prevent general investigatory searches into the suspect's person to
determine whether he has been drinking.76 The requirement of a prior
arrest almost always means a prior warrantless arrest in the blood test
context, since the police will not be able to investigate the crime and
obtain a warrant prior to taking the suspect into custody. The course
of events following a warrantless arrest can take two directions. Since
most states require that an officer making a warrantless arrest
immediately present the suspect to a magistrate in order that he be
charged with an offense,77 it would seem to be mandatory in those
cases where a magistrate is available that the accused be brought
before him unless the time involved would endanger the destruction of
the alcohol concentration in the blood. Because the magistrate would
be able to rule on probable cause prior to the test just as he would
make a similar ruling prior to granting a search warrant, the chances
that the application of the test will be arbitrary are lessened.
Unrestricted application of the emergency doctrine, on the other
hand, would require no such intervention by a magistrate, thus
substantially increasing the possibility of an arbitrary interference
with the suspect's liberty and privacy. The one exception to the
normal train of events following a warrantless arrest would be in
those cases where, either due to the time of the arrest or the distances
involved, no magistrate is available. The blood test would have to be
made prior to bringing the suspect before the magistrate in order to
prevent the destruction of the alcohol, and the suspect would have to
be held in custody until a magistrate is available. 78 In terms of judicial
administration, administering the blood test prior to bringing the
suspect before a magistrate does not differ significantly from allowing
an officer who has probable cause to believe that a suspect is
intoxicated, to request a blood test under the emergency doctrine. In
both situations a court or magistrate will have to determine after the
suspect's liberty and privacy have been infringed, whether the
76. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRaM. PRoC. § 140.20 (McKinney 1970) ("without unnecessary
delay"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46 (1965) ("immediately").
78. Such detention procedures have been enacted in many states. while some statutes
provide for the suspect's release on bail until a magistrates hearing can be arranged, such pre-
hearing bail generally would not be available to one who is suspected of being under the
influence of alcohol. See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 140.20 (1970).
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arresting officer had probable cause either to make the arrest or to
conduct the search. Determining probable cause is very difficult for a
court regardless of the order of events. Generally, the only evidence of
probable cause is the investigating officer's impression of the
accused's condition and mannerisms at the time he is taken into
custody, which evidence cannot be preserved for trial except by the
officer's testimony.79 Thus a determination of probable cause both by
the magistrate and at trial becomes in many instances a question of
whom to believe, the officer or the defendant.8 0 Nevertheless, a
warrantless arrest would help ensure that probable cause to conduct
the blood test did in fact exist, since the officer is bound by his
decision to arrest prior to the taking of the blood test. Unlike a search
under the emergency doctrine, the arresting officer cannot have the
test administered and then free the suspect until the test results
indicate whether an arrest is justified; once the suspect has been
arrested he cannot be released prior to a hearing before a magistrate.
Since the subsequent test will act as a check on the soundness of his
judgment in making the arrest, there is a greater degree of assurance
than under the emergency doctrine that the officer will make a
determination of probable cause at the time of the arrest.81 Where
there is a long delay between the administration of the test and the
formal arrest the courts have tended to invalidate the search.82 The
underlying assumption seems. to be that a long delay in arrest
decreases the probability that the investigating officer had anything
more than a mere suspicion that the driver was drinking and that the
real basis for the arrest was the results of the blood test.
79. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
80. See generally R. ERwIN, supra note 6, at § § 7.01-.03.
81. Another possible deterrent both against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unlawful arrests is the threat of a suit being brought against the police officer under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964) for deprivation of the suspect's rights. Such a threat may be more of a deterrent
than the actual suit itself. Since the officer would have a defense if probable cause existed, the
person bringing the suit may have some of the same evidentiary problems as have plagued him in
the situations discussed above. See generally Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and
the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965); Note, Tort Liability of Law Enforcement
Officers Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 30 LA. L. REv. 100 (1969).
82. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 227 So. 2d 728 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 271 A.2d 500 (1970); State v. Capelle, 285 Minn. 205, 172 N.W.2d 556
(1969); State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266,79 N.W.2d 8 10 (1957).
83. The delay, for example, might have stemmed from the arresting officer's awaiting the
outcome of the test. The amount of time involved between taking the blood test and obtaining
the results are dependent upon several factors. In rural areas where the sulfuric acid technique is
used to analyze the alcohol content of the blood, the results cannot be obtained for two or three
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In jurisdictions which have not made an arrest a precondition for
administering a blood test, the courts have not considered the time
span between the search and the arrest."4 The emergency doctrine is
independent of any arrest requirement in its application. Thus, even
where the defendent was arrested without probable cause, the blood
test would not be invalidated as fruit of the unlawful arrest so long as
probable cause for conducting the search was determined to have
existed.85 Without the requirement of a prior arrest the administering
of a blood test seems open to those abuses already discussed.8"
The requirement of an arrest prior to administering the blood test
will vary with state law, since arrest procedures are not delineated in
the Constitution. Generally an arrest can be made without a warrant
where a felony has been committed and the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed the crime.87
Likewise, in the case of misdemeanors an arrest can be made without
a warrant if the crime was committed in the presence of the officer. 8
Thus, where manslaughter is involved or where the officer sees the
defendant driving in a reckless manner, an immediate warrantless
arrest can be made. In such cases there is no reason for suspending the
arrest requirement, since the officer is not burdened by the delay of
obtaining a warrant and the defendant is afforded the minimal
hours. Since this test is generally performed by a local hospital not sufficiently staffed to
maintain its laboratory at night, the blood sample has to be preserved until morning. In most
medium sized communities, as well as in many rural communities, the most widely used analysis
technique is the enzyme method which yields a result in thirty minutes. If the hospital
performing the analysis maintains a night staff in its laboratory, the results of the test can be
obtained rather quickly. In larger metropolitan hospitals chromatographic techniques of
analysis are employed. The expensive equipment required for this technique makes its use
prohibitive in less populated areas or where blood tests are not normally relied upon. The results
of this technique can be obtained within ten to fifteen minutes. Due to great variance in the time
involved to obtain the blood test results, the mere fact that the test was contemporaneous with
the subsequent arrest may do very little to ensure that the arrest was made upon considerations
independent of the blood test results. Telephone conversations with laboratory personnel at
Watts Hospital, Durham, North Carolina.
84. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Quinones, 301 F. Supp. 246 (D.V.I. 1969); State v. Tolbert,
100 N.J. Super. 350,241 A.2d 865 (Crim. Div. Middlesex Co. 1968); State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa
733, 145 N.W.2d 650 (1966); People v. Huber, 232 Cal. App. 2d 663,43 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
85. A police officer might have probable cause to believe that an individual is intoxicated,
based on the individual's demeanor, while having no probable cause to believe that he has
committed a particular offense.
86. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
87. E.g., N.Y. CODE CrIaM. PROC. § 140.10 (MeKinney 1970).
88. E.g., N.J. STAr. ANN. § 39:5-25 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1204 (1960).
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protection of requiring the officer to commit himself by an
affirmative act prior to the administering of a blood test.
A more serious burden is placed on the police in cases where there
are no fatalities or where the officer does not see the suspect in the act
of driving. If the crime is only a misdemeanor and is not committed in
the officer's presence, most states require that an arrest warrant be
obtained."9 Requiring the police to obtain an arrest warrant prior to
arresting the suspect for driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, however, is no less a burden upon successful police
investigations than would be requiring a search warrant prior to the
administration of a blood test. This problem has forced some states to
relax their arrest requirement as one method to allow warrantless
arrest in drunken driving cases.90
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Schmerber did not clearly
indicate the extent to which the emergency doctrine can be applied to
the administering of a blood test prior to an arrest. The inherent
connection between an individual's body and his fourth amendment
right to be free of arbitrary infringements upon his privacy suggests
that a higher degree of protection is needed in the case of blood tests
than is offered by the emergency doctrine. The need is accentuated by
the substantial infringement on an individual's liberty which is
required merely to convey the individual to a location where the test
may be properly administered.
Requiring that the police make a lawful arrest prior to taking the
suspect into custody for a blood test should be the minimal
constitutional standard under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Such a standard places relatively little burden on the police since in
many cases a warrantless arrest can be made. In those states where
warrantless arrests for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence
of an officer are not permitted, some changes in the arrest laws may
be in order,91 but such changes are preferable to a lessening of the
89. Compare Colling v. Hjelle, 25 N.V.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1964), and State v. Nixon,
102 Ariz. 20, 423 P.2d 718 (1967) with State v. Tolbert, 100 N.J. Super. 350, 241 A.2d 865
(Crim. Div. Middlesex Co. 1968).
90. See. e.g., ARMZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1403 (Supp. 1970); N.D. CODE ANN. § 29-06-15
(Supp. 1969).
91. See note 90 supra. The amendment to the Arizona statute exempts from the normal
requirement that the arresting officer personally observe the commission of a misdemeanor,
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constitutional protection against arbitrary searches. A prior arrest
requirement would give the suspect the minimum protection of
separating the basis of his arrest from the blood test results. It would
also place some restraint upon the police officer in requesting a blood
test, since, depending on the circumstances, he would either have to
take the suspect directly before a magistrate or have the test
administered knowing that he had at least committed himself to
making the arrest. In either event there would be some assurance that
probable cause was based upon considerations independent of the
blood test results. Without requiring a prior arrest there seems to be
no alternative way of protecting individuals suspected of driving under
the influence of alcohol from arbitrary denials of liberty and privacy.
those violations of its motor vehicle regulations which occurred prior to or following a traffic
accident. Carried too far, of course, relaxation of the statutory arrest requirements would negate
the requirement of an arrest prior to the administration of a blood test.
